



Out of the Shadows: Projected Levels 
for Future REO Inventory
Guhan Venkatu
Nearly one homeowner in ten is more than 90 days delinquent on his mortgage payment. Most of the homes 
under these mortgages are likely to be repossessed by lenders and resold, which has led some to call them a 
shadow inventory. How much these homes will affect the broader housing market depends on when they actually 
become available for sale and how long they remain on the market. Some analysts are concerned that a surge in 
the availability of repossessed or real-estate owned (REO) properties, or a persistently high level of them, could 
put downward pressure on prices. This could, in turn, induce additional foreclosures. This Commentary presents 
three possible scenarios for future REO inventory levels.
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Figure 1. Current Stock of Seriously 
Delinquent Loans















According to the most recent estimates from the Mortgage 
Bankers Association, approximately 4.1 million borrow-
ers are in foreclosure or near it, the latter being borrowers 
who are more than 90 days delinquent on their mortgages 
(see ﬁ  gure 1). Together, these two groups of borrowers are 
sometimes called “seriously delinquent.” Both in absolute 
terms and as a proportion of outstanding mortgages, seri-
ous delinquencies remain near record highs.
Because a large fraction of these borrowers are also 
expected to have to leave their homes—either through the 
foreclosure process or some other distressed exit—observ-
ers have referred to this stock of homes as a “shadow 
inventory.” This inventory, it is feared, will soon ﬂ  ow onto 
the market, drive down prices further, and perhaps cause 
another wave of defaults.
One crude way of appreciating the size of this inventory is 
to translate it into the number of months it will likely take 
to sell this stock. At the current sales pace, the actual inven-
tory of existing homes for sale would take about 11 months 
to work through. Adding in the shadow inventory—which 
is about the same size as the actual inventory—roughly 
doubles the time to just under two years. Not surprisingly, 
this is well above historical averages. 
The shadow inventory has already had a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the composition of recent sales. RealtyTrac, a 
private company that tracks foreclosures, has reported that 
roughly one-quarter to one-third of the sales in the ﬁ  rst 
half of 2010 were associated with a home in some stage 
of foreclosure. This includes homes that have been repos-
sessed by banks or investors after a foreclosure, so-called 
real-estate owned (REO) properties, which accounted for 
just under two-thirds of these distressed sales. Distressed 
properties sold for 26 to 27 percent less than their non-
distressed counterparts. Aside from keeping downward 
pressure on prices, the shadow inventory has also limited 
new construction—new homes available for sale are at their 
lowest levels since the late 1960s.What can we expect going forward? This Commentary 
projects how the current shadow inventory could trans-
late into actual inventory, as properties move through the 
foreclosure process to become REOs. These projections 
show that even with fairly benign assumptions about the 
likely ﬂ  ow of loans into serious delinquency, and under 
various plausible assumptions about how the foreclosure 
and pre-foreclosure processes might change, the stock of 
REO properties is likely to remain elevated for the next 
several years. This should keep downward pressure on 
prices, though another factor inﬂ  uencing prices is how 
much deterioration properties suffer during lengthy pre-
REO processes.
Transition and Retention Rates
Until recently, the number of borrowers in foreclosure or 
more than 90 days delinquent was fairly stable, since the 
number of loans entering these categories was generally 
being balanced by the number of loans leaving them. But 
that balance has been affected by recent developments. 
The rising stock of seriously delinquent loans means that 
the ﬂ  ows into and out of foreclosure and 90+ day delin-
quency have changed in an appreciable way. Figure 1 sug-
gests that the number of loans ﬂ  owing into these categories 
is exceeding the number of loans ﬂ  owing out of them. 
What’s less clear, however, is how the ﬂ  ows themselves are 
changing. Understanding the way these ﬂ  ows are changing 
is critical, since these changes will ultimately determine the 
timing and number of REO properties that emerge. Data 
from LPS Applied Analytics allow us to track the move-
ments of loans through the process outlined in ﬁ  gure 2, 
and determine the rates at which loans are transitioning 
from one state to another.
Figure 3 shows how these ﬂ  ows have changed recently 
with respect to the 90+ day delinquency category. The 
ﬂ  ows are measured as the proportion of loans in a given 
category that move to some other state (transition rate) 
or remain in the same state (retention rate). From ﬁ  gure 
3, we can see a sharp increase in the proportion of loans 
that don’t transition out of 90+ day delinquency. The 
proportion rises from between 70 percent to 75 percent 
retention to around 85 percent retention more recently. 
This increase occurs toward the end of 2008, a change that 
could be consistent with rising bankruptcies and increas-
ing attempts to modify troubled mortgages, both of which 
would delay an impending foreclosure. This explanation is 
also consistent with what we see in the movement of loans 
from 90+ day delinquency to foreclosure. That propor-
tion falls at about the same time, and by approximately the 
same amount. 
A similar pattern is apparent with the foreclosure stock, 
though the timing differs. Prior to 2007, between 70 percent 
and 75 percent of loans in foreclosure in a given month re-
mained there the following month. More recently, however, 
a far greater proportion of foreclosures have survived to the 
following month—typically more than 85 percent. 
The timing of this increase coincides with the ﬂ  ood of 
foreclosures that began in late 2006. It could be that the 
sharp increase in new foreclosures overwhelmed the courts 
and other administrative foreclosure processes, decreas-
ing the disposition rate. However, it could also be the case 
that each individual foreclosure is taking about the same 
amount of time to work through the foreclosure process 
as before, but that there are simply more foreclosures that 
are in the early stages of this process. This compositional 
change would also generate the pattern that we observe in 
the data. Evidence from other sources suggests that both 
are in fact occurring.
The fact that a smaller proportion of loans are leaving 
foreclosure every month also means, of course, that a 
smaller proportion are transitioning to other states. Nota-
bly, prior to 2009, about 8 percent of loans in foreclosure 
were transitioning to REO properties. That proportion has 
been halved more recently. 
Figures 3 and 4 only show data associated with some of 
the ﬂ  ows illustrated in ﬁ  gure 2. However, we will use infor-
mation associated with all of the ﬂ  ows shown in ﬁ  gure 2 to 
estimate how quickly the current stock of seriously delin-
quent loans will likely move through the system. 




To current or paid off
To 
liquidation
To less serious states of 
delinquency
From less serious states of 
delinquencyFigure 3.  Monthly Transition and Retention 
Rates for 90+ Day Delinquency Stock
Source: LPS Applied Analytics.
Note: Rates shown are 3-month moving averages.
Figure 4. Monthly Transition and Reten-
tion Rates for Foreclosure Stock
Source: LPS Applied Analytics.
































Using alternative assumptions about retention and tran-
sition rates, I simulate three different scenarios for the 
growth path of the REO stock. All three scenarios share 
some assumptions, including how many new loans will 
ﬂ  ow into serious delinquency over the course of the simu-
lation, how many properties will be sold out of REO each 
period, and how large the current REO inventory is. 
The number of loans that are likely to ﬂ  ow into serious 
delinquency over the course of the simulation is based on 
recent history. According to data from LPS, the number 
of loans transitioning to 90-day delinquency from 60-day 
delinquency averaged about 50,000 per month from 2005 
to the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2007. These ﬂ  ows then rose sharply, 
averaging about 200,000 throughout 2009, before falling 
markedly in 2010 to about 150,000 by mid-year. I assume 
that these ﬂ  ows decline in even increments over the projec-
tion period from 150,000 loans to the levels that prevailed 
from 2005 to early 2007. This assumption generates a 
relatively slow decline in this ﬂ  ow, which is consistent with 
earlier regional housing booms and busts, where delin-
quencies and foreclosure starts remained elevated for years 
after having peaked. 
For REO liquidation rates, I estimate from the data that 
about 15 percent of each month’s REO inventory is sold. 
This corresponds to an average REO timeline of just over 
6½ months, and would include the time needed for repairs 
or other work to make the property marketable.
Finally, several sources have estimated the current REO 
inventory to be about a half-million homes. I use this as 
the starting size of the REO stock. 
Scenario 1: Transition and retention rates remain essentially 
unchanged
For the ﬁ  rst scenario simulated, transition and retention 
rates remain essentially as they are currently. 
Under the full set of assumptions, the REO stock rises 
modestly, and then drifts gradually downward to just 
below 350,000 by the end of the third year (ﬁ  gure 5). At 
this point, about 2.8 million loans will have transitioned 
to REO; 2.3 million loans will remain in a state of serious 
delinquency; and about 3.0 million loans will have exited 
the system by permanently transitioning to a less serious 
state of delinquency, becoming current, or paying off.
Scenario 2: Increase in transition rate from 90+ day delinquency 
to foreclosure
For a few reasons related to the federal government’s mort-
gage modiﬁ  cation efforts, we might expect the transition 
rate associated with the movement of loans from 90+ day 
delinquency to foreclosure to increase soon. The Home 
Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP) is the federal 
government’s primary mortgage modiﬁ  cation initiative. 
Modiﬁ  cations initiated through it generally involve a three-
month trial phase, which if completed successfully, should 
result in a permanent modiﬁ  cation. As a consequence, the 
program has had an inﬂ  uence on delinquency timelines, 
slowing the transition to foreclosure, but this is likely to 
diminish soon for the following reasons.
First, the number of new trial modiﬁ  cations being started 
has slowed substantially in recent months. In the second 
half of 2009, new trials were being initiated at a monthly 
rate of about 130,000. That ﬁ  gure has fallen by more than 
half, to roughly 55,000, for the ﬁ  rst six months of 2010. Moreover, in July and August, the average was about 
17,000 trials started. It seems likely that the number of 
new trials will continue to diminish. 
Second, most of the trials that have been started have not 
transitioned to permanent modiﬁ  cations. The roughly 
660,000 borrowers who were unable to successfully com-
plete their trial modiﬁ  cations, and for whom foreclosure 
had been held off, are likely to transition to foreclosure 
soon. Finally, the number of active trial modiﬁ  cations has 
fallen from just over 450,000 in May to just over 200,000 
in August. As fewer borrowers are in active trial modiﬁ  ca-
tions, a larger proportion of 90+ day delinquencies will be 
transitioning to foreclosure; put another way, the transition 
rate from 90+ day delinquency to foreclosure will rise. 
In the second scenario simulated, I assume that this transi-
tion rate rises to 20 percent, close to the levels seen toward 
the latter part of 2007 and in early 2008, from 7 percent 
in the initial simulation. (Outside of a smaller proportion 
of 90+ day delinquencies being retained as a result of 
this change, all other rates in the initial simulation remain 
unchanged.) Because the transition rate from 90+ day 
delinquency to foreclosure increases while the transition 
rate from foreclosure to REO stays the same, the initial 
impact is a build-up in the foreclosure stock (ﬁ  gure 5). This 
is associated with an increase in the number of properties 
moving to the REO stage. As long as this ﬂ  ow into REO 
exceeds the ﬂ  ow out from liquidations, the REO stock will 
build. This is exactly what we observe in the simulated 
path until July 2011.
The REO stock rises gradually until peaking in mid-2011 
at about 720,000 in this scenario, before falling gradually 
thereafter to about 530,000 by the end of the third year. At 
this point, about 4.0 million loans will have transitioned 
to REO; 2.1 million loans will remain in a state of serious 
delinquency; and about 2.0 million loans will have exited 
the system by permanently transitioning to a less serious 
state of delinquency, becoming current, or paying off.
Scenario 3: Increase in transition rate from foreclosure to REO
We could imagine the transition from foreclosure to REO 
increasing again to levels more like those from earlier in 
the decade. This would correspond with an increase in the 
rate at which courts and other administrative units work 
through their backlogs. For the purposes of this simula-
tion, I assume that these transition rates rise roughly to the 
levels that prevailed prior to 2009—10 percent. (Outside 
of a smaller proportion of foreclosures being retained as a 
result of this change, all other rates in the initial simulation 
remain unchanged.)
Not surprisingly, the increase in the transition rate from 
foreclosure to REO is reﬂ  ected initially in a much larger 
REO ﬂ  ow than in the other two scenarios—speciﬁ  cally, 
twice as large at about 200,000 (ﬁ  gure 5). Subsequent 
monthly additions diminish through time, just as we saw 
in scenario 1, though at a more rapid rate. The result 
is a sharp increase in the REO stock, peaking at about 
825,000 in December 2010; thereafter, the stock falls fairly 
sharply to about 400,000 by the end of the third year of 
the simulation. At this point, about 3.8 million loans will 
have transitioned to REO; 1.6 million loans will remain in 
a state of serious delinquency; and about 2.7 million loans 
will have exited the system by permanently transitioning 
to a less serious state of delinquency, becoming current, or 
paying off.
Clearly, these results hinge importantly on an array of 
assumptions. Among these, the assumption about the ﬂ  ow 
of loans from 60-day delinquency to 90-day delinquency 
Figure 5.  Projected REO Stock Table 1.  Projected Numbers of Loans in 

























1 2.3 2.8 3.0
2 2.1 4.0 2.0
3 1.6 3.8 2.7is worth considering. The assumption is that these ﬂ  ows 
will fall over the three-year projection period from current 
levels to what was typical prior to the recession. How-
ever, given current forecasts for various macroeconomic 
variables, it seems optimistic to think that households 
will experience the same relatively low levels of ﬁ  nancial 
distress in 2013 that they experienced prior to 2007. This 
suggests that even fairly optimistic expectations imply 
elevated REO levels for a few years to come. Importantly, 
these elevated REO levels arise and persist despite possible 
changes to pre-REO processes, as shown by the second 
two simulations. 
Aside from differences in REO levels, each scenario also 
produces different predictions about how loans will work 
through the system and what routes they may take to exit. 
Table 1 shows the numbers of loans in each simulation that 
have transitioned to various states by the end of the projec-
tion period. In scenarios 2 and 3, roughly 4.0 million loans 
will have transitioned to REO during the three-year period. 
This is at least a million more than we observe in scenario 1. 
Essentially, the changes to transition rates in scenarios 2 and 
3 increase the throughput of loans, so that more loans move 
through to REO. The ﬂ  ip-side of this is that more loans 
remain in serious delinquency in scenario 1. 
But the gap in the ending stock of seriously delinquent 
loans between scenarios 2 and 1 is fairly small. That’s 
because far fewer loans make a non-REO related exit from 
the system in scenario 2. The highest likelihood of making 
a non-REO exit (i.e., transitioning to a less serious state 
of delinquency, becoming current, or paying off) occurs 
when a loan is in the 90+ day delinquency pool. Because 
we signiﬁ  cantly increase the transition rate from 90+ day 
delinquency to foreclosure in scenario 2, we more quickly 
draw down the size of this pool. As a consequence, we ef-
fectively deprive more loans of the opportunity to exit the 
system through some means other than REO.
Conclusion
These simulations estimate the timing and number of 
REO properties that might ultimately emerge from the 
substantial stock of homes currently in the so-called 
shadow inventory. Will this stock—which has been able to 
accumulate partially as a consequence of various attempts 
to help homeowners avoid losing their homes—ultimately 
ﬂ  ood the market, and put even more downward pres-
sure on prices? Such a development would be worrisome, 
since falling prices would push more homeowners “under 
water,” which could in turn induce more borrowers to 
default. 
The admittedly simple scenarios outlined above suggest 
that if loans were to move through 90+ day delinquency 
and foreclosure at rates common prior to the onset of the 
crisis, we would indeed see a more substantial stock of 
REO properties enter the market. To this extent, scenario 
1 looks like a preferable outcome, in that the outstand-
ing stock of REO properties rises only modestly, before 
beginning to diminish. This path seems likely to have less 
pronounced price effects than the larger increases in REO 
properties associated with scenarios 2 and 3. However, one 
important element not captured by these simulations is the 
quality of the properties that emerge as REOs. 
The slower rate of REO production in scenario 1 is also 
associated with longer foreclosure and delinquency dura-
tions. The problem with this circumstance is that as a 
borrower falls further and further behind on his payments, 
it becomes increasingly unlikely that he will ever be able to 
repay arrearages and reinstate his mortgage. At this point, 
if he continues to occupy his home, he may be disinclined 
to maintain it as an owner would. Alternatively, a borrow-
er may decide to leave his property during the course of a 
foreclosure. In this instance, the home may sit vacant for 
months until the foreclosure is ﬁ  nalized, a potential target 
for thieves and vandals. These instances illustrate that 
longer timelines for foreclosure and delinquency are likely 
to reduce property values, and not only for the foreclosed 
properties, but also for those in the neighborhood. As a 
consequence, just like a large increase in REO properties, 
this too could induce additional foreclosures.
Determining which of the above scenarios, or any potential 
REO path, is likely to have the most benign consequences 
for prices, and accordingly for foreclosures, requires under-
standing which of these two effects is more dominant. Guhan Venkatu is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The views he expresses here are his and not necessarily those of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve Board.
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